ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the forces contributing to the worldwide longrun rise in obesity and the role of public interventions in affecting its continued growth. A growth in obesity in a population must result from the growth of calorie consumption outpacing the growth of physical activity. Yet historically in developed countries, obesity has grown with modest rises in calorie consumption and with a substantial increase in both exercise and dieting.We consider the economic incentives that give rise to the long-run growth in obesity by stimulating intake of calories at the same time as discouraging the expending of calories on physical activity, whether in work or leisure. We argue that technological change provides a natural interpretation of the long-run growth in obesity, that it predicts that the effect of income on obesity changes from positive to negative with economic development, and that it implies that technological change may not continue to raise weight.We discuss the positive and normative impacts of direct and indirect public interventions to reduce obesity. O BESITY IS TYPICALLY TREATED as a problem of public health or personal attractiveness. It is those things-but it is even more an economic phenomenon. More than many physical conditions, obesity is avoidable by behavioral
changes, which economists expect to be undertaken if the benefits exceed the costs. The principal task of this paper is to investigate whether the economic benefits and costs of obesity can fruitfully be used to explain its variations across time and populations.
There has been little previous economic analysis of the forces contributing to obesity, although the question is related to other issues in the economics of health (Arthur 1982; Cawley 1999; Ehrlich and Chuma 1992; Grossman 1972; Philipson and Becker 1998; Rosen 1988 Rosen , 1994 Wolf and Colditz 1988) . This neglect is un-fortunate, because obesity is a major issue of health economics and public finance. More Americans are obese than smoke, use illegal drugs, or suffer from ailments unrelated to obesity, and obesity is considered by most health professionals a substantial risk factor for most of the highly prevalent serious diseases, including heart disease, cancer, and diabetes. It therefore affects major public programs such as Medicare and Social Security. Obesity affects wages as well as the overall demand for and supply of health care; Americans spend many billions of dollars each year trying to lose weight through diet or exercise.
In ordinary language, obesity is a pejorative term, as the related term overweight makes even clearer. But in a model of human behavior in which people are assumed to be rational actors, there is no such thing as being "overweight." A person's weight in such a model is the result of personal choices along such dimensions as occupation, leisure-time activity or inactivity, residence, and, of course, food intake. Being either fat or thin may therefore be as desirable from the individual's standpoint as adhering to weight norms set by doctors and the public health community. Since at least the 1960s, the medical profession has promoted the idea that obesity impairs health and longevity (Ippolito and Mathios 1995) . Mortality due to lack of exercise and to excessive caloric intake is estimated to be second only to tobacco consumption in the number of deaths that could be prevented by behavioral change (McGinnis and Foege 1993) . 1 Yet the percentage of obese people, commonly if rather arbitrarily defined as those who are more than 20 percent above their medically determined "ideal" weight, has been growing worldwide (WHO 1997, p. 19) . In the 1980s, the percentage of Americans more than 20 percent above their "ideal" weight in-creased from about 25 percent to about 33 percent (VanItallie 1996; see also Kuczmarski et al. 1994) . Almost 60 percent of Americans do not exercise enough from the standpoint of controlling their weight to the level that is medically ideal.
However, the growth in weight does not appear to be a recent phenomenon. Costa and Steckel (1995) discuss the large secular increases in average height-adjusted weight by age for different birth cohorts. These trends were more pronounced in the early part of the century, although the extreme weights in the tails of the distribution often associated with obesity may be a more recent phenomenon. More precisely, there appears to be a substantial growth in weight after World War II that may be related to changes in labor markets during that period, in particular the shift from manufacturing to services.
We argue that there are important economic reasons for this long-run growth in weight and obesity, and we present alternative implications generated by the framework that we use to explain these time trends. Sedentary technological change (technological change that results in a substitution of low-physicalenergy for high-physical-energy work) has lowered both the real price of food and the physical expenditure of calories per hour worked in market and household production. By doing this, it has contributed to the rise in obesity in two ways: by lowering the cost of consuming calories, and by raising the cost of expending them. Our hypothesis of a technologically-induced rise in obesity suggests a natural economic interpretation of such puzzling phenomena as the growth of obesity during a period in which there has been little or no increase in long-run calorie consumption-this despite a continually falling price of calories and a concurrent rise in dieting and recreational exercising. 2 In an agricultural or industrial society, work is strenuous; in effect, the worker is paid to exercise. And when public welfare is ungenerous, as it is in most such societies, the cost of not exercising through work can be dire-in the extreme, it can result in even starvation. In a postindustrial and redistributive society, such as that of the United States today, most work entails little exercise, and not working does not cause a reduction in weight, because food stamps and other welfare benefits are available. As a result, people must pay for undertaking-rather than be paid to undertake-physical activity. Payment is mostly in terms of foregone leisure, because leisure weight control must be substituted for weight control by physical exertion at work.
The jogging and gym revolution and the limiting of calorie consumption as a result in part of deliberate dieting can thus be interpreted as substitutions brought about by technological changes in market and household work. But despite these off-the-job substitutions, overall obesity can still rise as a result of technological change that causes fewer calories to be expended in market and non-market work. Indeed, the technological-change explanation of increased obesity is almost inevitable: because calorie consumption has not risen substantially on average, physical activity must have fallen. 3 Moreover, evidence from developing countries suggests that the effect of income on calorie intake is small at the levels of income observed in developed countries (Strauss and Thomas 1995) .
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The income gains associated with technological progress may make the rise in obesity self-limiting, however, at the point at which the sedentary effects of such progress are dominated by the effect of rising income in increasing the demand for thinness. The complex impact of income gains on weight is due to the non-monotonic effect of weight on utility or welfare (that is, to the fact that weight raises utility at low weight levels, and lowers utility if weight exceeds a certain threshold), a functional form that drives many of our results.When being healthier means gaining weight, wealthier individuals will weigh more, so there will be a positive relation between income and weight. But when being healthier means losing weight, they will weigh less, and there will then be a negative relation between income and weight. A positive relation between income and health therefore implies an inverted U-shaped relation between income and weight (Grossman 1972) . Consistent with this hypothesis, obesity today falls with income and education in rich countries and rises with income in poor countries (Jeffery et al. 1991; Smuts 1992, pp. 523-24) . Being close to an ideal weight is what is valued, and demand for this good rises with income. If income increases the demand for thinness in the conditions of a technologically advanced society, economic development will dampen the weight-increasing effect of income within countries, and economic growth will cause an initial period of weight gains to be followed by a period of weight reductions.
What we are calling sedentary technological change may be a rational response to the incentives for the research and development (R&D) of food production technologies. One obtains calories through food, and R&D has lowered the cost of food dramatically, As a result, far fewer resources are used to produce calories today than in the past. R&D thus has an asymmetric impact on the intake and spending of calories, and the bias is in the direction of increasing weight. When sedentary technological change occurs in poor countries, it not only raises incomes but also reduces the strain on a scarce food supply, thus raising income while at the same time reducing the cost of meeting the physical demands of generating that income.
Our analysis has positive and normative implications for public interventions to reduce obesity (USDHHS 2000; WHO 1997 ). An indirect effect of many government programs, whether they relate to food and exercise directly or indirectly, may be to raise weight. This depends on the incidence of the program (that is, on who bears the cost), the relative effects on rich and poor, and the non-monotonic effect of income on weight. Given an inverted U-shaped relation between income and weight, progressive programs (the cost of which are borne disproportionately by the rich) will raise weight, because those at both ends of the income distribution will gain weight; similarly, regressive programs will result in lower overall weight. The weight effects of transfer programs also depends on whether the transfer comes in the form of earned income, as in Social Security, or unearned income, as in welfare without workfare.
Regarding the normative effects of government intervention, the increase in obesity in itself has given rise to demands for public intervention-mainly in the form of public education programs-to reduce obesity through better diet and more exercise.The medical profession and the public health community describe obesity as an "epidemic" and urge increased public as well as private programs of weight control and reduction (Mokdad et al. 1999) . In evaluating the normative properties of government programs to reduce obesity, we emphasize the difference between an individual's being overweight in a medical sense, which from a rational-choice perspective does not demand public intervention, and the population's being overweight in a social welfare sense, in which aggregate costs across the entire population exceed aggregate benefits, implying that people would be willing to pay others to lose weight if such transactions could be arranged (Keeler et al. 1989 ). Since health is not everything in life, rational people may eat more and exercise less than third parties-such as the medical profession or people who find the obese repulsive-advise them to do. If people in possession of all the key facts relating to the health consequences of obesity, and who also know that to lose weight you must either eat less or exercise more, still prefer their high-paying sedentary jobs to more physically demanding ones that pay less, and still prefer sedentary to physically demanding leisure-time activities, education campaigns are unlikely to have large effects on weight. If information is the problem behind obesity, then obesity should be falling; instead, it is rising, which implies that fewer people are willing to pay the price-in effort, expense, or forgone pleasure and leisure-of limiting their weight. Some public interventions may actually cause weight to be excessive. For example, since smoking is a method of weight control, anti-smoking measures may contribute to increasing obesity.
Obesity and Technological Change
In this section we consider the predictions of weight within and across populations that stem from a rational choice model. As is well understood in rational choice analysis, such analysis is not meant as an introspective guide to how people think about their choices, but rather as a precise and internally consistent methodology to generate hypotheses about their behavior. In Philipson and Posner (1999) , we derive the hypotheses discussed here more formally, and the reader is referred to that paper for a more technical analysis of the issues.
The Determination of Weight with Exogenous Physical Activity
First consider the individual's choice of weight with physical activity held constant.This is a partial analysis but is not completely unrealistic, since there is a fixed minimum of such activity below which, unless immobilized because of illness, injury, or other disability, people do not fall. Assume that weight (W) is affected by the intake and expenditure of calories according to the function W (F,S) , where F is the intake of calories ("food") and S denotes the calories used in physical activity, whether through work or leisure, so that W rises with F but falls with S. This function varies across individuals depending on how biological, genetic, or other factors influence the relation between nutrition and physical activity on the one hand and weight on the other. As far as the interaction between intake and spending of calories is concerned, we assume they are complementary: the more calories are expended, the more valued is calorie intake, so that the cross-derivative W FS is positive. A person is assumed to act as if he maximized utility U(W(F,S),S,F,C) defined over weight, physical activity, food intake, and consumption of goods and services other than food, C. An important property of the utility function is that it has an inverted U-shape with respect to W.The assumption is that there is an ideal weight, W 0 , that the individual does not prefer to be above or below of, holding other consumption constant. W 0 is thus the weight that would be chosen if achieving one's preferred weight were costless. We assume that this ideal weight does not depend on the level of consumption of other goods and that there is diminishing marginal utility of consumption of both food and alternative goods, i.e., U FF ,U CC < 0.
We also assume that gaining weight is more valued the more underweight a person is and less valued the more overweight a person is. That is, the inverted Ushaped function over weight is concave as well:
The subjective ideal weight of a person, W 0 , may or may not correspond to the weight that maximizes health or longevity, although it is likely to be influenced by concern with these factors. Being "overweight" is a subjective property; very thin girls may prefer to lose weight. Even people who would prefer to be at the weight that minimizes the adverse health consequences of being overweight might choose not to be. But neither the subjective nor any "objectively" ideal weight W 0 is necessarily the most preferred weight in the economic sense, because we have not considered the full range of costs and benefits of achieving it. With physical activity held fixed at S, the most preferred weight depends on opportunities and preferences in food consumption.A person's rationally chosen weight is the one that makes him the happiest given the existing costs and benefits of food consumption.
Assuming that S is given, this corresponds to the food intake that solves the maximization problem Max U(W(F),F,C) subject to the constraint S92 To m a s J . P h i l i p s o n a n d R i c h a r d A . P o s n e r
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C + pF = I
where p is the price of food or the intake of calories and I is income.The rational choice of how many calories to consume thus balances the weight effect and joy of eating against the foregone consumption of alternative goods:
The conditions for being rationally over-or underweight are rather weak, whether with respect to one's own subjective ideal weight or with respect to an objective ideal weight set by a third party such as the public health community. This point helps explain not only the number of underweight and overweight individuals, but also the divergence between subjective and objective obesity: the National Center for Health Statistics reports that only 44 percent of the women and 25 percent of the men who are classified as overweight by the medical profession consider themselves overweight (U.S. Department of Commerce 1998, Table 243 ).
We emphasize three implications of the rational model of weight choice. First, if weight were the only concern that people had in making decisions on consuming or expending calories, no one (other than someone morbidly obese as a result of an untreatable medical condition) would weigh more than his or her subjective ideal weight. Because calorie intake is costly, weight gains above the subjective ideal weight must be valued positively at the optimal level of food intake. So weight concerns alone cannot explain obesity when food is costly.The exclusive concern with weight by the public health community is inconsistent with the concerns revealed by the behavior of many populations-including many people in the public health community itself.
Second, there is a natural complementarity between calorie intake on the one hand and calorie expenditure through physical activity on the other. A rise in the amount of calorie expenditure, S, shifts the marginal benefit of eating upwards. More precisely, under certain conditions, it can easily be shown that physical activity raises calorie intake, so that the most preferred food choice as a function of physical activity, F(S), increases. Third, there is a limit on how far reductions in price or gains in income can raise weight.When utility is separable in weight, food, and non-food consumption, the price of calories has a negative effect on weight, and income has a positive effect: dW/dp < 0 and dW/dI > 0.
However, at high incomes or low prices, weight becomes inelastic (that is, relatively unresponsive) to income and price respectively. The marginal benefit of the first-order condition will be declining and turn negative at the caloric intake level, denoted F M , that would maximize the utility from eating if food were free. So there is an upper bound on weight
above which there is a net loss from consuming more calories even if they are free, because the utility loss from additional weight dominates the joy of eating. More precisely, under fairly weak conditions, as price goes towards zero (food becomes free) or income rises indefinitely, the most preferred weight W approaches the upper bound W M . Thus, as technological change lowers the price of food or raises income, weight will not continue to grow indefinitely, because of its non-monotonic effect on utility.
Non-Monotonic Income Effects on Weight
The inverted U-shaped effect of weight on utility implies that income may have an inverted U-shaped effect on weight as well, when wealthier individuals care more about their health and hence their weight.The key here is a complementarity between consumption and weight. Without any complementarity, income must raise food consumption and hence weight. The weight-income profile will have an inverted U shape only when the effect of consumption on the marginal disutility of weight gains is relatively higher for higher incomes, that is, when the health "price" of greater food consumption (because of the effect of consumption on weight and of weight on health) rises with income (Philipson and Posner 1999) . The intuition behind this surprising result is that when food prices are low, people prefer to consume calories, but their concern with being overweight limits their caloric intake. If wealthier or better-educated people care more about their health and hence weight, for health or other reasons, they limit their weight more.When food prices are high relative to incomes, however, many people are underweight because they cannot afford sufficient caloric intake, but wealthier individuals forgo other consumption in order to maintain or gain weight. So technologically less developed economies, in which the share of income spent on food is large because food is relatively expensive to produce, can be expected to exhibit a positive relation between income and weight because richer individuals care more about their health; for the same reason we expect technologically advanced economies, in which income is high relative to the price of food, to exhibit a negative relation between income and weight (Jeffery et al. 1999; Sobal and Stunkard 1989) . In other words, the effect of income in increasing weight should fall with economic development, because the ratio of income to costs of producing food is higher in the advanced nations. So in poor or early societies, the obese are relatively wealthier, but in wealthy modern societies the obese are relatively poorer. In the absence of other effects operating at the same time, such as the effect of technological change in making work more sedentary, income growth will tend to make the growth in obesity brought about by declining food prices self-limiting.
S94
To m a s J . P h i l i p s o n a n d R i c h a r d A . P o s n e r
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
Sedentary versus Non-Sedentary Technological Change
Thus far, we have assumed that increases in income through technological change occur independently of any changes in physical activity. When technological change affects the physical activity required to participate in market or non-market activity, we denote by S(I) the calories spent under the technology that generates per-capita income I, whether through work-or leisure-based activities. Technological change is sedentary if this function is decreasing, and non-sedentary if it is not decreasing. A person's weight is then W(S(I),F(S(I),I)) and the effect of technological change, including its impact on physical activity, is given by dW/dI = W S S I + W F [F S S I + F I ].
The pure income effect on food consumption, F I , is the key determinant if technological change does not affect physical activity-that is, if S I = 0. This pure income effect may be positive for low incomes and negative for higher incomes. If technological change is sedentary, the pure income effect on weight is adjusted in two ways: it is increased by the more sedentary lifestyle brought about by the technological change (the first term on the right hand side of the equation); and it is decreased because of the complementarity between calorie intake and calorie expenditure.The future trend of obesity may depend on which of these offsetting forces dominates. If new technology makes us richer by moving less, this may be offset by whether we care more about our health and weight when gaining the income induced by the new technology.
Endogenous Calorie Usage and Physical Lifestyles
We have thus far assumed a fixed level of physical activity. But the amount of physical activity is, of course, a choice affected by occupation, housing, transportation, and preferences for leisure-time exercise. Let I(S) denote the income that can be earned when S calories (endogenously chosen) are expended. The marginal effect I S thus measures the loss or gain in income from a more active lifestyle, e.g., when giving up time at office-work for exercise.The relevant measure of income is full income, including any tradeoffs involving higher-earning but more sedentary jobs, cheaper suburban housing and the sedentary forms of transportation (commuting versus walking) that suburban living encourages, and technological change that enables more efficient but also more sedentary household or market production. The most preferred choice of intake and expenditure of calories now solves 
The first condition is identical to the one discussed before, but is now also conditional on the optimal level of calorie expenditure. The second condition implies that a necessary condition of the most preferred choice of weight is that the individual is overweight if and only if he forgoes income to expend calories, that is, W > W 0 , if and only if I S < 0. This follows from the fact that the marginal utility of weight gains is negative when a person is overweight and positive when he or she is underweight. The second condition requires that this marginal utility, U W , have the same sign as the effect of physical activity on income, I S .This requirement has important consequences for the effect of technological change on the growth of obesity.Technological change has caused the price of calories to fall (i.e., food prices have declined), and the amount of physical exertion required when supplying labor to fall also. In an agricultural or an industrial society, work is strenuous; in effect, the worker is paid to exercise and I S is positive. In a modern postindustrial society, work tends to be sedentary, so people must pay for undertaking physical activity, and I S becomes negative.
One of the important ways in which physical activity relates to income is through the effects of the allocation of time on weight.The amount of time that one works, and the character of one's work, affect weight in at least two respects: by increasing income, which we have shown has an important effect on weight, and by affecting the number of calories expended on the job. By reducing the number of calories expended per hour worked, technological change in the workplace has reduced the financial rewards of controlling weight, and so has increased obesity; but this trend has been accompanied by a rise in off-the-job physical activity, illustrated by increased jogging and by increased use of treadmills and other exercise machines in homes or in gyms. 4 The full effect on weight of a fall in the calories spent per hour worked depends on how it directly affects weight, holding inputs constant, together with how it affects the inputs into producing weight. The reduction in calories expended per hour of work may allow weight gains to occur, even though food intake is falling and off-thejob exercise is rising. Other things being equal, the secular shift in work from manufacturing and mining to services, most of which involve light work, and the secular decline in food prices would imply that average weight would be higher in modern, developed nations. Other things are not equal, however, since, as we have just seen, the technological changes that reduce physical activity on the job
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Public Intervention to Limit Obesity
The public health community, and many health economists, have raised concern about an impending "crisis"-an international obesity "epidemic." The most commonly recommended public intervention to combat the alleged epidemic is publicly financed education about the benefits of dieting and exercising. This section considers the impact of such direct measures intended to affect weight, as well as more indirect effects induced by the income effects of policy measures.
Positive Effects of Government Intervention: The Impact of Incidence on Weight
If the majority of people understand how to lose weight, simply by eating less or exercising more, public education programs will have small effects. Indeed, given that obesity has increased during an era in which people know more about the effects of being overweight, lack of knowledge is an unlikely explanation for that increase. Public spending aimed at persuading people to reduce their food consumption is likely to be swamped by private advertising designed to increase food consumption. For example, in 1997 the federal government spent some $330 million on nutrition education, while the food industry, second only to cars in total advertising spending, spent some $7 billion to advertise their products (USDA 1999), more than 20 times as much, though doubtless much of this advertising simply affects the market shares of competing sellers of food products rather than maintaining or increasing the overall demand for food.
Although direct measures to affect weight may be important, indirect effects through income transfers may be a significant factor as well. In understanding the overall rise in obesity, in particular the rise in obesity among the poor, the effect of government transfer programs cannot be ignored. To illustrate the nature of the effect, consider the case in which average weight reaches its peak as a function of income at W* (income at which is I*), as in This shows that the more progressive a program is (the closer b to -1), the more it raises weight W T above the level that would prevail in the absence of transfer payments, W N .The amount of the increase depends on the effect of income on weight, as represented by S, because the smaller the effect of income on weight the smaller is the effect of a redistribution of income on weight.The progressivity of government programs has an important effect on weight because both the payers and receivers will tend to gain weight when the income profile has an inverted U shape.This analysis implicitly assumes that the transfer income is unearned, by assuming that changes in I do not affect S, but the argument holds in the case in which it is earned, when I does affect S, as in retirement or workfare programs, unless the effect of the earning condition is to induce physical labor.
The Normative Effects of Government Intervention
While people may be overweight in a medical sense, or may even be overweight with respect to their own preferred weight, an economically sound case for public regulation cannot be based on deviations from either of these ideals. It must be based, rather, on deviations from the ideal ("pareto-optimal") weight distribution in a population, which in an economic analysis means deviations that people would be willing to pay others to reduce or eliminate. They would be willing to do this only if obesity imposed an "external" cost, that is, a cost on persons other than the obese person himself or people with whom he transacts, such as his employer. An essential normative question, therefore, is whether obesity imposes external costs that might warrant public intervention, as through Pigouvian taxes (taxes designed to curtail an activity rather than to raise revenue), or through subsidies.
One external effect is physical appearance, a good enjoyed not only by the person himself but by others observing him. Although many people would derive benefits from increased "beauty" of strangers encountered in the streets and other public places, and beauty in our society is negatively related to obesity, the pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of beauty are so great that the responsiveness of weight to tax or subsidy policies would probably be small. Since, moreover, personal beauty is a positional good (one is beautiful in com-
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Another possible external effect of obesity, as of any other health-related behavior, derives from the public financing of health care (see, for example, Keeler et al. 1989) . It may seem obvious that since medical care is heavily subsidized, and obesity increases morbidity and mortality (Narbro et al. 1996) , taxing obesity would be certain to reduce a negative externality, namely the externalizing of the costs of obesity-induced poor health to the taxpayer. But this ignores the fact that reducing mortality increases the fraction of the population that is elderly, and the elderly not only consume a disproportionate fraction of medical expenditures but are more heavily subsidized for those expenditures than younger people. There are tradeoffs here both between health expenditures per period and the number of periods (that is, the length of life), and between the subsidized and the non-subsidized fraction of health expenditures. Suppose that taxing obesity would reduce average per-period medical expenditures by 10 percent but increase average length of life by 5 percent; then lifetime medical expenditures would fall by approximately 5 percent. But suppose further that the percentage of lifetime expenditures subsidized would increase-because more people would be living to Medicare-eligibility age-from 20 percent to 30 percent. Then the size of the net subsidy would increase by roughly 40 percent. A further consideration is that efforts to lose weight impose their own health costs. Apart from the direct costs of diet pills and the like, there is the indirect cost of eating disorders and dangerous weight losses (Flynn 1997) .
If obesity does create a negative externality, the current campaign to reduce smoking, which has been effective, especially in the case of males, becomes questionable, because smoking is a method of weight control (Grunberg and Klein 1998, p. 174; WHO 1997) . In that respect it is a substitute for exercise, and for many people a lower-cost substitute, since it substitutes a purchased product for time in controlling weight. Indeed, one possible interpretation for why women have reduced their smoking less than men is their greater concern with weight control.The magnitude of the decline in smoking in the United States in recent decades is not, however, a plausible explanation for the rise in obesity, because the effect of smoking on weight is small (Flegal et al. 1995; Gerace et al. 1991; Green and Harari 1995; Mizoue et al. 1998; O'Hara et al. 1998 ). Still, we can expect cigarette producers to join with meat producers in opposing a tax on obesity, since a reduction in obesity would reduce the demand for cigarettes.
Like efforts to reduce smoking, efforts to reduce heart disease by reducing the intake of saturated fats may paradoxically contribute to obesity. Foods that contain fat allay hunger pangs faster than other foods, and so people who reduce their fat intake often substitute carbohydrates that increase the eater's overall caloric intake (Brody 1999) .
Even if it were desirable to reduce weight through Pigouvian taxes or subsidies on food intake or physical activity, the weight effects of such measures would be mitigated by the complementarity between calorie intake and physical activity. A Pigouvian tax would partly be offset by reactive changes in untaxed determinants of obesity, unless the tax package included a heavy tax on calories.
Alternative Hypotheses
The following are a few possible alternative hypotheses to our own for explaining secular changes in obesity.
Government Redistribution
The large prevalence of obesity among the poor in many developed countries seems to be a phenomenon partly caused by redistributive policies. As we have discussed, progressive policies will tend to raise weight and regressive ones lower it. Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) estimate the income profile of weight and find strong support for the inverted U-shaped income profile that generates these implications concerning the effects of such policies. However, even though the qualitative effect of progressive policies is to raise weight, for the United States the quantitative magnitude of the weight gain is likely to be only a small factor in the overall weight gains observed in recent decades.The reason is that the income profile is not steep enough, the rate at which weight falls with changes in income is small, and the overall incidence of transfer programs is only mildly progressive. Thus, in the United States the rise in government income redistribution may not be quantitatively important relative to other changes, such as those in technology, in explaining the growth in average weight and obesity.
Asymmetric Information, and Obesity as a Signal
It is often argued that income historically was positively related to weight, because being obese indicated a high status when not everyone could afford to eat. This is essentially an argument that weight is a signal under asymmetric information about wealth. In the 19th century, thinness was a signal of malnutrition and tuberculosis, and fatness a signal of prosperity; stout men and women were therefore considered handsome, and stout women beautiful and sexy. It may be doubted, however, how many people actually overate in order to signal prosperity, since alternative, less costly signals were available. In any event, with the virtual eradication of malnutrition and tuberculosis in the wealthy countries, and with expenditures on food a steadily falling percentage of household expenditures, obesity ceased to have value in signaling valued traits; instead it became a negative signal (Cassell 1995) .Today, thinness may be valued as a signal of trustworthiness, because it indicates a degree of self-control or self-discipline (Brow-S100 To m a s J . P h i l i p s o n a n d R i c h a r d A . P o s n e r nell 1991, p. 4; Smuts 1992, pp. 530-32) . 5 As with other signaling activities, a signaling interpretation of thinness implies that there may be over-investment in thinness from a social standpoint, which would cast further doubt on the value of public programs designed to combat obesity.
Since people preferred in the past to signal obesity but prefer today to signal thinness, signaling cannot be a complete explanation, because it predicts that obesity should fall rather than rise over time. Another consideration that limits the plausibility of a signaling explanation of obesity and thinness is that weight is a highly imperfect signal. Because people differ in their genetic ability to control their weight, one's amount of willpower or self-discipline cannot simply be inferred from one's thinness (Bouchard 1991; Brownell 1991, p. 8) .
Market versus Household Production of Food
Market production of food has increasingly become a substitute for household production (Haines et al. 1992) .This is a natural consequence of, as opposed to a different explanation from, the increase that technological change, whether or not sedentary, has brought about in the value of time. Indeed, it is often argued that fast food is responsible for the rise in obesity. The fact that food is delivered faster is a natural response to increased value of time; the output foregone per meal has risen, holding the time it takes to eat constant.The increased value of women's time in the job market is particularly important here, since women traditionally prepared the family's food at home. Technological change may have increased female participation in the labor force, thereby raising the demand for market-, as opposed to self-, produced food. But in a competitive market for food preparation, it is unlikely that homemakers and restaurants would have different incentives with regard to caloric supply. Put differently, there does not appear to be excess demand for restaurants that serve healthier foods, such as sushi. It is therefore unlikely that a rise in obesity can be blamed on the fast-food industry, especially since caloric intake has not increased on average. And while it has reduced women's physical exertion on preparing food in their kitchens, the fast-food industry cannot be held accountable for much of the reduction in physical activity.
Addiction, Genes, and Obesity
Two further possible explanations of obesity are that eating is addictive or that there is a large genetic component to obesity that is not much influenced by the incentives stressed in our analysis. The problem with both explanations is that although they may explain differences in obesity among groups and individuals, 
Directions for Future Research
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future research, particularly empirical research. An important first objective would be to estimate the extent to which physical activity on the job has affected obesity. In an empirical analysis related to the theoretical discussion in this paper, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) estimate the importance of job-related physical activity in explaining weight differences in the United States during the last three decades and find, holding other factors constant, that physical demands across occupations have large effects. Indeed, they find that job strenuousness has a substantially larger impact on weight than do other economic factors, such as education and income. In addition, they decompose the growth of weight and argue that composition effects are trivial and that technological change, if interpreted as an unobservable timetrend, is the major source of weight growth during the period investigated. More precisely, they find that, despite the fact that people in the United States are getting taller and richer and more income is being redistributed, these changes in composition are not responsible for a large fraction of weight growth when compared to technological change. There are several other ways to assess the importance of job-related sedentary technological change, for example by looking at changes over time in the effect of retirement on weight; the effect should change as work becomes more sedentary. However, the fact that job-related physical activity can be more easily measured does not mean that it is more important than changes in leisure activities. The effect of technological change on leisure activity may be empirically important for certain population groups, such as children, who have experienced substantial weight gains recently but are not active in the labor market. Television and computers have made children happier but more sedentary in their leisure activities; although they can still play games physically rather than on the computer, they choose to do the latter. However, it is not easy to empirically measure and quantify these technological changes in leisure. Another important issue, but one that is equally difficult to study, concerns the complementarity in parental and child activities, both in the intake and the expending of calories.
A further direction for future research concerns gender differences in weight and the role of matching markets (the marriage and dating markets) in determining weight. If weight negatively affects one's ability to make a desired match, we would expect unmarried people today, as consumers in the marriage market,
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To m a s J . P h i l i p s o n a n d R i c h a r d A . P o s n e r to be thinner than married people, thereby implying that the rise in the age of marriage and the rate of divorce in recent decades has actually increased the physical health of the population.The objection to attributing too large a role to rising divorce rates in the determination of weight is that this trend would imply a decline, as opposed to a rise, in obesity. In addition, rational expectations may tend to limit the value of temporary reductions in weight at the initial phase of the match.
There is empirical evidence that women are more concerned about their weight than men and are more likely to be dieting (Brownell 1991, p. 4) . The greater value of thinness to women is reflected in studies that find a greater negative correlation between earnings and overweight for women than for men (Averett and Koreman 1996; Pagán and Dávila 1997; Register and Williams 1990) . Since marriage can be viewed as a form of employment and each spouse as the other's employer, these studies imply that a wife's household "wage" is reduced more by obesity than her husband's household "wage" is. The reason is that men value physical attractiveness in women more than women value physical attractiveness in men (see Sobal, Nicolopoulos, and Lee 1995) . Hence the decline in the gains from marriage that have contributed to the increased divorce rates may be a factor in the growth of obesity among women.To the extent that women can support themselves and so do not value marriage as highly as when their only good opportunities were within the marital household, they no longer need to "pay" as much for a husband by painful dieting. If technological change is the ultimate source of the reduced gains from marriage induced by the growth of female labor force participation (for example, the technology of contraception and the technology of automation that has reduced the demand for factory workers relative to service workers), it may also be a good explanation for why women have gained more weight than men over time. A more precise prediction might be of greater variance in female weight, over time, relative to the male "ideal" of a woman's weight. Some women may desire to be thinner than that ideal, and others heavier; both deviations are more likely when women perceive smaller benefits from being married.
A much higher percentage of black women than of white women are overweight: 49.2 versus 33.5 percent (Chitwood et al. 1996; VanItallie 1996, p. 891 ,  Table 2 ).There may be two economic reasons, even after correction for possible genetic differences (Argyropoulos 1998 ). The first is that among poor people, who in the United States are disproportionately black, thinness continues to be a signal of possible poor health or bad habits-drug addicts, alcoholics, people with AIDS, and homeless people tend to be thin because of malnutrition or disease. It is therefore not altogether surprising that although there is a positive correlation in the black community between slenderness and attractiveness, black women have higher weight ideals than the ultra-thin ideals held by white women (Flynn 1997; Harris 1995; Riley et al. 1998; Thomas 1988) . Second, the marriage market is badly stacked against black women (Mullin 1998; Philipson and Posner 1993, pp. 75-78) . This could incite even greater efforts of some women to achieve attractiveness, but it would reduce the gains from attractiveness to those women who would have poor marital prospects even if they invested heavily in increasing their attractiveness.When young, marriageable black men are hard to find, the matching incentive of black women to control their weight is reduced.
A better understanding is also needed of whether an economic approach is useful for explaining the large cross-country differences in obesity. If technological progress differs across countries, the observed positive relationship across countries between weight and income may be consistent with declining withincountry income profiles. Weight may be positively related to income when the technology generating the higher income is more sedentary, so that cross-country technology differences dominate within country differences. For example, Europeans are thinner on average than Americans, and the reason may be technological and hence economic rather than "cultural" (Seidell 1995) . Food is cheaper in the United States than in Europe; most European cities were designed before automobile transportation became common; and Europe is less suburbanized than the United States. These factors, plus the much higher price of gasoline in Europe, can be expected to contribute to Europeans being less sedentary. The fundamental cause may simply be higher land prices in Europe, which result in Europeans living much closer to each other and to work and shopping, at distances where walking is more efficient than driving. In addition, the United States is the world's leading innovator in passive entertainment, which is highly sedentary. Americans watch much more television than Europeans, in part because American television offers much more variety than European. Indeed, about half the leisure time of the average American is spent watching television (Robinson and Godbey 1997 )-a completely sedentary activity (except for people who use exercise equipment while watching). Other things being equal, the higher the quality of television, the higher is the opportunity cost of recreational exercise and hence the lower the demand for thinness. Television is a peculiar product, because the marginal pecuniary cost of consumption is zero (except for pay TV), and so small increases in perceived quality may lead to significant increases in consumption.
Finally, we have not addressed the supply side of treatments for obesity. Given the prevalence of obesity in wealthy countries, particularly in the United States, the incentives for obesity-reducing R&D are great. Among the new lifestyle drugs that are being developed, obesity-reducing drugs would have one of the largest potential markets, particularly since they would benefit both genders.The size of the potential market, and hence the great incentives for new obesityreducing interventions, should perhaps make one optimistic about future treatments that improve on the ones currently being marketed.
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